The Domestication of Man: The Social Implications of Darwin by Clark, Gregory
Gregory Clark
The Domestication of Man: The Social Implications of Darwin
ArtefaCToS, vol. 2, n.º 1, diciembre 2009, 64-8064
ArtefaCToS
Vol. 2, n.º 1, 64-80
Diciembre 2009
eISSN: 1989-3612
The Domestication of Man: 
The Social Implications of Darwin
La domesticación del hombre: 
las implicaciones sociales de Darwing
Gregory Clark
Department of Economics. University of California. Davis, CA, USA 
<gclark@ucdavis.edu> 
Fecha de aceptación definitiva: 17 de julio de 2009
Abstract
It is often assumed that human evolu-
tion ended by the time of the Neolithic 
Revolution, which brought settled agrarian 
societies. This paper argues that instead 
the period from 8000 BC to 1800 AD was 
a period of greatly accelerated human 
evolution, where we can observe marked 
changes in some basic human behaviors. 
Humans “self domesticated” themselves 
to the conditions of market economies. 
They may thus bear the same relationship 
Resumen
Se suele asumir que la evolución humana 
termina en el momento en que acontece 
el Revolución del Neolítico, es decir, con el 
asentamiento de las sociedades agrarias. 
En este artículo, en cambio, se sostiene 
que el período comprendido entre el 8000 
AC y el 1800 DC se produjo una acele-
ración en la evolución humana, algo que 
puede observarse en algunos cambios 
importantes que han tenido lugar en 
comportamientos humanos básicos. 
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Modern humans evolved 250,000 years ago. The Neolithic Revolution, the shift 
from hunting and gathering to settled agriculture, occurred around 6,000 BC. 
The history of mankind is overwhelmingly the history of hunter-gatherers.
With the arrival of settled agriculture and stable property rights 8,000 years 
ago people domesticated a large number of plants and animals. The wolf became 
the dog, the wild boar the farmyard pig. Dogs, cattle, sheep, pigs, chickens 
all were transformed from wild animals to domesticated servants of humanity. 
Fundamental aspects of their natures changed. Dogs have their origin in East 
Asian wolves, but they have acquired traits wolves do not possess. Dogs, for 
example, can read human faces and human actions in a way that wolves cannot, 
even when wolves are socialized with people from birth. 
Until recently, however, the one creature in the modern farmyard that was 
believed to be unchanged from Paleolithic times was man himself. We are 
assumed to still remain in our original wild form. “Our modern skulls house 
a stone age mind”1. For humans the Darwinian era was presumed to have 
ended with the Neolithic Revolution.
Based on ethnographies of modern forager societies, at the dawn of 
the settled agrarian era people were impulsive, violent, innumerate, and lazy. 
Abstract reasoning abilities were limited. If we are biologically identical with 
these populations then only the thin patina of civilization separates us from 
 1. Cosmides & Tooby, 1997.
to their hunter gatherer forbears as the 
modern dog bears to the wolf. The source 
of these changes was “survival of the 
richest” in the pre-industrial period.
Key words: Evolution, Malthus, Darwin, 
Domestication, Pre-Industrial Economy.
Los seres humanos se han auto-domesti-
cado adecuándose a las condiciones de las 
economías de mercado. Pueden compartir 
la misma relación con sus predecesores 
cazadores tanto como el perro moderno 
comparte con el lobo. El motivo que dio 
lugar a estos cambios fue la “supervivencia 
del más rico” en el período preindustrial.  
Palabras clave: evolución, Darwin, domes-
ticación, economía pre-industrial. 
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the underlying violence and impulsivity of human nature. Scratch away that 
restraint and we would revert to our natural passions. 
In my recent book, A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the 
World I argue two things. First that all societies remained in a state I label the 
“Malthusian economy” up until the onset of the Industrial Revolution around 
1800. In that state crucially the economic laws governing all human societies 
before 1800 were those that govern all animal societies. Second that was 
thus subject to natural selection throughout the Malthusian era, even after the 
arrival of settled agrarian societies with the Neolithic Revolution. 
The Darwinian struggle that shaped human nature did not end with the 
Neolithic Revolution but continued right up until the Industrial Revolution. But the 
arrival of settled agriculture and stable property rights set natural selection on a 
very different course. It created an accelerated period of evolution, rewarding 
with reproductive success a new repertoire of human behaviors – patience, 
self-control, passivity, and hard work – which consequently spread widely. 
 And we see in England, from at least 1250, that the kind of people who 
succeeded in the economic system – who accumulated assets, got skills, got 
literacy – increased their representation in each generation. Through the long 
agrarian passage leading up to the Industrial Revolution man was becoming 
biologically more adapted to the modern economic world.
Modern people are thus in part a creation of the market economies that 
emerged with the Neolithic Revolution. Just as people shaped economies, 
the pre-industrial economy shaped people. 
This has left the people of long settled agrarian societies substantially 
different now from our hunter gatherer ancestors, in terms of culture, and 
likely also in terms of biology. We are also presumably equivalently different 
from groups like Australian Aboriginals that never experience the Neolithic 
Revolution before the arrival of the English settlers in 1788. 
The argument here thus unites the doctrines of Malthus and Darwin in 
studying human history. This is intellectually satisfying since Charles Darwin 
himself proclaimed his inspiration for On the Origin of Species was Malthus’s 
On a Principle of Population2.
 2.  Darwin, 1969.
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The reason there was opportunity for significant cultural and genetic change 
even after the Neolithic Revolution is that up until the Industrial Revolution all 
societies were kept in balance with their resources by Malthusian forces.
Pre-industrial technology advanced so slowly that material living standards 
depended on population pressure on fixed land resources. When people were 
few, living standards were good. But good living standards produced more 
births, and better childhood survival. Population would thus always grow until 
births and deaths were in balance. 
This can be illustrated in one simple diagram, figure 1. The horizontal axis 
for both panels is material income. In the top panel birth and death rates are 
plotted on the vertical axis. The material income at which birth rates equal 
death rates is called the subsistence income denoted in the figure as y*. This 
is the income that just allows the population to reproduce itself. At material 
incomes above this the birth rate exceeds the death rate and population is 
growing. At material incomes below this the death rate exceeds the birth rate 
and population declines. Notice that this subsistence income is determined 
without any reference to the production technology of the society. It depends 
only on the factors which determine the birth rate and those that determine 
the death rate. 
In the bottom panel population is shown on the vertical axis. Once we 
know population, that determines income, and in turn the birth rate and death 
rates.
With just these assumptions it is easy to show that the economy will always 
move in the long run to the level of real incomes where birth rates equal death 
rates. Suppose population starts at an arbitrary initial population: N0 in the 
diagram. This will imply an initial income: y0. Since y0 exceeds the subsistence 
income, births exceed deaths and population grows. As it grows, income 
declines. As long as the income exceeds the subsistence level population 
growth will continue, and income continue to fall. Only when income has fallen 
to the subsistence level will population growth cease, at the equilibrium level, 
N*, and the population stabilize. 
The Darwinism of Pre-industrial Societies
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in the Malthusian Economy.
With population in Malthusian balance the average women in pre-industrial 
society produced 5 children, but only two survived to adulthood. But these two 
had to be selected by some mechanism from the average of 5 children each 
women had in the pre-industrial era. And as long as mothers and fathers varied 
in their characteristics this survival process favored some types of individuals 
over others. The Darwinian struggle that shaped human nature did not end 
with the Neolithic Revolution, but continued indeed right up to 1800.
Figure 1 implies that reproductive success, the number of offspring a person 
leaves on their death, increased with income. The curves in figure 1 are drawn 
for society as a whole. But within any settled agrarian society there are huge 
variations in income per person at any time. The existence of land and capital 
as assets that generate rents allowed some individuals to command much 
greater shares of output than others. The same Malthusian logic thus implies 
that those who are successful in economic competition in settled agrarian 
societies, those who acquire and hold more property, or develop skills that 
allow for higher wages, would also be more successful reproductively. 
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There is ample evidence for England in the years 1250-1800 that this 
Darwinian selection based on wealth did indeed operate. While the average 
man in England before 1800 produced two surviving children, rich men typi-
cally produced many more than two surviving children: 4 was the norm for 
the rich in pre-industrial England from 1250-1850. 
Figure 2 shows the numbers of surviving children per male testator in 
England in 1630, where men are grouped by wealth at death. Even though 
these testators were drawn from the wealthier half of the population, the 
poorest of them had fewer than two surviving children. Those too poor to 
even leave a will presumably produced even fewer offspring. The children of 
the rich, their culture as well as their genetic material, were taking over pre-
industrial society. 
Figure 2: Surviving Children per Male Testator, by Wealth at Death, England c. 1630.
This association between wealth and reproductive success stretches back 
in England as far as the written record extends. Figure 3 shows the average 
number of surviving sons per father for England for the decades 1250-1650 
inferred from data on the aggregate movement of population. As can be 
seen, except for the phase of population growth up to 1315, this number was 
close to one. The second series in figure 3 is the implied average number of 
adult male children produced by royal tenants in chief, a rich segment of the 
population. 
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In the two periods in medieval England where the population was stable 
or growing, 1250-1349, and 1450-1500 the tenants in chief were producing 
on average about 1.8 surviving sons, nearly double the population average. 
Even in the years of population decline from 1350 to 1450, though implied 
surviving sons per tenant in chief declined, it remained at above the replace-
ment rate of in most decades. Thus, as later, in medieval England the rich 
were out-reproducing the poor.
Figure 3: Sons per Father, England, 1250-1650.
We can show the Darwinism of pre-industrial England directly in a further 
way through looking at the distribution of surnames over time3. Much more than 
in Spain, there are many surnames in England held by very small numbers of 
people. I identify two groups of rare surnames in England 1560-1640. The first 
was rare surnames held by economically successful men in Essex and Suffolk, 
as revealed by their leaving a will. The second group was rare surnames held 
by a man on the margins of society, someone indicted in the Essex courts 
in the years 1598-1620 for assault, burglary, theft, poaching, robbery and 
murder. The indicted were overwhelmingly from low socio-economic groups, 
as revealed by their occupations and literacy levels. 
 3. Clark, 2009.
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For rare surnames a significant fraction of the holders will typically be related: 
brothers, cousins, second cousins. We know wealth and social status was 
strongly correlated between fathers, sons and brothers4. Thus the average man 
holding the same rare surname as a successful man in 1600 will be relatively 
wealthy. The average man holding the same rare surname as someone indicted 
in 1600 will be relatively poor. That is we can identify a subset of surnames 
where the typical holder was wealthy or poor in 1600.
I can then look 250 years later, in the census of 1851, for the frequency 
of these rare surnames which will be held by the genetic descendants of 
the men we observe in 1600 or their close relatives. We can compare the 
frequency of the names of the rich versus the criminal of 1600 in the same 
area of England. Table 1 shows the frequency of the occurrence of these 
names in 1851 in the south east of England. At the median the richest testa-
tors left more than seven times as many descendants 250 years later than 
did those indicted in the criminal courts. Survival of the richest was a very real 
phenomenon in pre-industrial England.
Group N
Median 
Occurrence 
Name disappeared 
by 1851 (per cent)
Indicted (Criminals) 337 9 35
Poorest Testators 147 36 21
Middling Testators 289 48 19
Richest Testators 204 67 17
Table 1: Name Frequencies in 1851
Preindustrial England was thus a world of constant downward mobility. 
Given the static economy, the superabundant children of the rich had to, on 
average, move down the social hierarchy in order to find work. Craftsmen’s 
sons became laborers, merchant’s sons petty traders, large landowner’s sons 
smallholders. Attributes that ensured later economic dynamism – patience, 
hard-work, ingenuity, innovativeness, education – were thus spreading throug-
hout the population by biologically. 
 4. Clark, 2008.
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In 1936 Ernest Hemingway remarked to the critic Mary Colum, “I am getting 
to know the rich”. Colum replied, “The only difference between the rich and 
other people is that the rich have more money’’5.
If Colum was correct then the differential survival of the rich would have had 
no long lasting impact on culture or genetics in these societies. But we know 
from pre-industrial England that economic success was highly hereditable. 
The sons of the rich also tended to be rich. And indeed the connection was 
more powerful than in modern economies. 
Figure 4 shows the wealth of sons who left wills in England compared to their 
fathers. Wealthy fathers tended to produce wealthy sons. This implies in turn 
that the rich were passing on their reproductive advantage to their children.
The rich in pre-industrial England also had different abilities and aptitudes 
than the poor. Had the advantage of the rich been only their inherited wealth, 
the fortunes of their sons would depend crucially on how many siblings they 
had. The more siblings, the less of the assets of the father each child would 
receive, and the poorer would be sons. 
But even the sons of wealthy fathers with many siblings tended themselves 
to die wealthy. Rich fathers produced rich sons, even when they had so many 
children that the inheritance explains little of the son’s wealth. Mainly what the 
sons of rich fathers inherited was the economic abilities of the fathers.
Figure 4: Sons’ Wealth compared to Fathers’, England 1550-1850.
 5. Eddy Dow, New York Times, Nov 13, 1988.
Were the Rich Different from the Poor?
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Modern ethnographies suggest that hunter-gatherers were impulsive, violent, 
innumerate, illiterate, and lazy. Death rates from violence were much higher than 
in modern societies. Impatience dominated economic activities. And abstract 
reasoning abilities were limited. Most of these societies have no other words 
for number than “one”, “two” or “many”.
There have been at least three major observable changes in very basic 
human behaviors since the adoption of settled agriculture. People have become 
more patient, less violent, and harder working. 
Interest rates, which measure the average level of patience, fell from 
astonishingly high rates in the earliest societies to close to modern levels 
by 1800. The interest rate is the reward for waiting to consume, rather than 
consuming now. Since the Industrial Revolution the gross return for waiting, 
for investments in the safest assets, is around 3 per cent per year correcting 
for inflation. The net return after tax is more like 2 per cent. 
The earlier we go, the higher measured interest rates were. Figure 5 
shows, for example, the return on land investments in England from 1200 to 
2000. Medieval England had interest rates typically 10 per cent or greater. 
By the eve of the Industrial Revolution these had fallen to 4 per cent. 
All societies before 1400 show high interest rates. In ancient Greece the temple 
of Delos, which received a steady inflow of funds in offerings, invested them 
at a standard 10 per cent mortgage rate. Temple endowments from tenth 
century AD South India typically yielded 15 per cent. Quoted interest rates for 
earlier agrarian economies are higher. In Sumer 3000-1900 BC interest rates 
on silver loans were 20-25 per cent. 
In forager societies evidence on rates of return is indirect. There is no 
capital market. Anthropologists, however, can measure time preference rates 
through the relative rewards of activities with immediate benefits compared to 
those with future benefits: digging up wild tubers now, compared to clearing 
ground and planting gardens with a reward months in the future.
Mikea forager-farmers in Madagascar, for example, have enormous returns 
from maize cultivation: 74,000 kcal. per hour of work. Foraging for tubers, in 
comparison, yield hourly returns of only 1,800 kcal. Despite this the Mikea 
forage for most of their food, since maize takes time to grow. This implies 
extraordinarily high time preference rates. 
How Human Behavior Changed in the Last 6,000 Years
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The Pirahã of Brazil are even more indifferent to future benefits. A brief 
overview of their culture included the summary,
Most important in understanding Pirahã material culture is their lack of concern 
with the non-immediate or the abstraction of present action for future benefit, 
e. g. ‘saving for a rainy day’6. 
Figure 5: Return on Land Investments in England, 1200-2000.
We can also observe that societies have become less violent over time. 
Hunter-gatherer societies are characterized by high rates of death from violence. 
Typically 10-20 per cent of men would die violently. Within the agrarian era 
we see the rates of violence within societies decline substantially. 
Figure 6 shows the death rate per 1,000 men per year from murder in 
England from 1190 to 2000. Even in the middle ages these rates were only 
0.2 per thousand, which is less than a tenth of the typical hunter-gatherer 
rate. Less than one man in a hundred would dies as the result of murder. But 
these rates declined substantially subsequently. By 1700 they were at rates 
lower even than for the modern USA. 
 6. Everett, 2005, Appendix 5. 
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Figure 6: Homicide Rates for Males, England, 1190-2000.
Work hours rose between the hunter gatherer era to modern levels by 1800. 
The typical male hunter-gatherer worked only 5-6 hours per day, counting all 
work activities. In England by 1800 paid work alone was nearly 9 hours per 
day, counting across every day of the year. 
As a whole these changes show societies becoming increasingly middle 
class in their orientation. Thrift, prudence, negotiation and hard work were 
imbuing themselves into communities that had been spendthrift, violent, 
impulsive and leisure loving. 
While we observe Survival of the Richest going along with significant changes 
in behavior in pre-industrial England, could Darwinian forces explain this asso-
ciation? This is simply a matter of how hereditable these traits were, and how 
much reproductive advantage they gave.
Hereditability is simply the correlation between parental behavior and child 
behavior. For traits important to breeders of farm livestock – milk yield, fleece 
weight, litter size, body weight – hereditability varies, but averages around 
0.4. This relatively low number implies that most of the variation in features 
like offspring body weight comes from random features. 
Can Survival of the Richest Explain Changing Human Behaviors?
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Yet despite this just by selection animal breeders have been able over a few 
hundred years to greatly change the attributes of domestic animals. The medieval 
cows and sheep in England were tiny compared to their modern equivalents.
Economic success, measured by the correlation of wealth at death between 
fathers and sons, was much more heritable in the pre-industrial world than 
the average animal trait. The correlation here for father-son pairs in England 
was more than 0.6. And the reproductive advantage that economic success 
gave was very great.
Suppose for simplicity we assume that economic success mainly came 
from possession of some complex trait, Z, which depended additively on 
the inheritance of a favorable draw of many factors (for the moment we 
can be agnostic about whether this was passed on genetically or cultu-
rally). This trait, for example, would include how hard people worked, and 
how patient they were. How much would possession of this trait change 
between generations in pre-industrial England?
Figure 7 shows an assumed initial distribution of the trait, assumed to follow 
a normal distribution in the first generation with a mean at 0.5. Assuming the 
reproductive advantage of the rich was as shown above for England, and a 
hereditability of 0.6, the figure shows how the trait would be distributed among 
the offspring in the next generation. The average level of trait Z in the next 
generation increases by nearly 7 per cent on the base. 
Figure 7: The Distribution of Economic Abilities across Generations, England, 1630.
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Thus even one generation in pre-industrial England is enough to change 
the distribution of the expressed trait significantly. There would be 18 gene-
rations between 1200 and 1800, plenty of time for significant changes in 
peoples’ economic aptitudes. If we take the much longer interval between 
the Neolithic Revolution and the Industrial Revolution we are talking about 
8,000 years, 240 generations. Time enough for significant changes in the 
way people behaved.
We see changes in basic behaviors before 1800. We see also the much greater 
reproductive success of those who embodied the more modern economic 
behavior. 
The mechanism of inheritance might still be purely cultural, a culture passed 
down vertically within families. For practical purposes of social policy this has 
the same impact as genetic inheritance, since the overwhelming majority of 
children are raised by their genetic parents. 
If one society experienced this process for a longer time, or more severely, 
than another then its members would have a persistent advantage in economic 
competition whatever the source of this advantage.
However modern information on the transmission of economic success and 
educational attainment between generations suggests most of these changes 
would be genetic. The rich in modern industrial society are genetically different 
from the poor. Stated thus boldly and starkly this seems a shocking, elitist 
statement. Nevertheless this genetic difference shows in a number of ways. 
First we can look at how closely identical twins resemble each other in 
incomes compared to same-sex fraternal twins. With random mating identical 
twins share 100% of their genes and fraternal twins only 50%. Under any 
reasonable assumption environments will be equally similar for fraternal 
as for identical twins. If genetics made no difference to income the 
income correlation for identical and fraternal twins would be the same. In 
fact, identical twins show a stronger correlation of income than for fraternal 
twins: 0.4 versus 0.27. That implies that at least 50% of the transmission of 
income earning abilities from parents to children is genetic.
 7. Bowles & Gintis, 2002, 14.
Changed Genetics or Changed Culture?
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However marriage is assortative. People marry those who are like them-
selves in education and income. Thus even fraternal twins share more than 
50% of their genes. The higher correlation of incomes between identical as 
opposed to fraternal twins is thus based on even less than a 50% difference 
in genetic material. Genes must explain even more of income. With reasonable 
assumptions about the degree of assortativeness in modern mating, genetics 
explains at least 60% of the correlation between brothers’ incomes.
The second source of information we have on the role of genes is the 
outcomes for adopted children compared to their biological and adoptive parents. 
The educational attainment of adopted children in Sweden depends on both 
that of their adoptive and biological parents. But the impact of the biological 
parents education is roughly double that of the adoptive parents8. This is not 
directly evidence on income and wealth, but education levels are important 
predictors of both of these. Clearly genes explain the majority of educational 
attainment in modern Sweden. 
Studies of criminality, using either twins or adoption methods, similarly 
reveal a strong genetic connection. The chance a Danish adoptee would end 
up with a criminal record when neither set of parents had one was 13.5 per 
cent. When only the adoptive parent had a criminal record this chance rose very 
slightly to 14.7 per cent. However if only the biological parent had a criminal 
record the chance of the adoptee having a criminal record rose much more, 
to 20.0 per cent. If both sets of parents had a criminal record the chance of 
the adoptee having such a record was 24.5 per cent. Genetic influences on 
criminal propensities are much greater than environmental influences9.
These studies imply that a large fraction of the changes we observe in 
human behavior in the historical period, indeed the majority of these changes, 
are indeed genetic in nature.
 8. Bjorklund, Jantti & Solon, 2007.
 9. Mednick et al., 1984.
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8,000 years ago people discovered the benefits of sedentary agriculture and 
abandoned the hunter-gatherer lifestyle. This led, however, to what was likely 
an accelerated period of evolution for humans as they adapted themselves 
to the new environment of markets and capital.
Evidence from pre-industrial England suggests that economic success 
in agrarian society was rewarded with reproductive success and was highly 
hereditable. Evidence from the modern world establishes that economic 
success is mainly genetically determined. There must thus have been rapid 
genetic change from generation to generation in these genes in societies like 
pre-industrial England.
This suggestion fits well with recent claims that the rate of evolution among 
humans speeded up in the past 10,000 years. A recent study of variations in 
DNA across individuals concluded that “Rapid population growth has been 
coupled with vast changes in cultures and ecology, creating new opportunities 
for adaptation. The past 10,000 years have seen rapid skeletal and dental 
evolution in human populations, as well as the appearance of many new 
genetic responses to diet and disease”10.
In one particular case, the evolution of lactose tolerance has been traced 
in Northern Europeans to only the last 5,000-10,000 years11.
The different histories of different human populations over the last 8,000 
years may thus have lasting effects on the outcomes of economic competition 
between these groups in the modern world. The long histories of societies 
may have a surprisingly persistent effect within the modern world, and explain 
some of the persistent disparities in incomes between social groups and 
countries.
 10. Hawks et al., 2007, 20,753.
 11. Bersaglieri et al., 2004.
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